Foreword

PATSY T. IVHNK*

Harold Lasswell's classic definition of politics as a process involving "who gets what, when and how"' is perhaps the most appropriate description of the current state of the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). These negotiations have long been
characterized-by publicists, diplomats, and even the media-as an
essentially juridical exercise, a legal test of the ability of the global
community to refashion a major aspect of its international relations.
However, the recently concluded Sixth Session of UNCLOS has once
again demonstrated that the major dimensions of these critical
negotiations remain political. That is, in the classical and traditional
sense of international politics, the Conference represents a major
systemic conflict among diverse national and international perspectives, values, norms, and expectations. In effect, law of the sea has
become caught up in the larger North-South dialogue on reform of
2
the international economic order.
WHo GETS WHAT

The Sixth Session of UNCLOS was held in New York from 23 May
to 15 July 1977. Its product was the controversial Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT),3 a comprehensive Law of the Sea
(LOS) text that is designed to displace the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT)4 as the substantive base for future negotiations.
* Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.
1. H. LASSWELL, PoLITIcs: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN AND How (1958).
2. For a succinct Department of State discussion of the agenda of the NorthSouth dialogue, see DEP'T OF STATE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE THIRD WoRLn

(Discussion Paper 1976) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
3. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62fWP. 10 (1977).

4. U.N. Doc. AIConf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1 (1976).

Although the Sixth Session continued progress toward the resolution of issues critical to freedom of navigation, international security,
environmental protection, and dispute settlement, it failed, in a major way, to adequately reflect and register the necessary compromise
on several issues of vital concern to the general Conference membership. Of5these, by far the most important is the issue of deep seabed
mining.
According to the Lasswellian formula, disagreement over the seabeds issue necessarily focuses on the question of "who gets what."
Not surprisingly, therefore, the element of major controversy within
the negotiations centers on the terms and conditions of access to the
seabed area. Industrial countries which have developed, or are in the
process of developing, the requisite technology for deep seabed mining are seeking a nondiscretionary, nondiscriminatory access system,
one which will ensure exploration and exploitation opportunities to
States and/or State-sponsored entities under reasonable, clearly
specified conditions. Such a system, we argue, will ensure security of
tenure for prospective deep seabed miners, enhance incentives for the
necessary investments of capital and technology, and, thereby,
guarantee that the "common heritage" will be adequately developed
for the benefit of mankind.
Developing countries and certain land-based producers would vest
primary proprietary and regulatory control over the deep seabed in
the International Seabed Authority. Under the terms of the ICNT, 6
the Authority would be empowered on a discretionary basis to estab7
lish terms and conditions of access which would:
5. The problems of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged

States (LL/GDS) are another outstanding example of the session's failure to
adequately respond to the perceived interests and needs of an important bloc of
States.
The LL/GDS Group comprises 53-plus States within the Conference membership. The issues of primary concern to this group appear to be:
(a) right of access to and from the sea and freedom of transit;
(b) LIGDS rights with respect to fisheries in the economic zones of
their respective neighboring States;
(c) a reasonable system of international revenue-sharing from the exploitation of resources on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles;
(d) adequate participation and representation in the system of exploitation of the deep-sea area; and
(e) several general interests which converge with the concerns of the
entire Conference membership, for example, dispute settlement, high
seas status of the exclusive economic zones, and so forth.
6. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 621WP. 10/pt. XI & Annexes II & HI (1977).
7. See Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 373, 387-88 (1978) (Richard G. Darman is the former United States
Deputy Special Representative for the Law of the Sea Conference).
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(1)

impose an arbitrary governmental system of production and

price controls, oriented toward protection of the current system
of production and producers, without favorable regard to what

may be the economic advantages of new systems of production or
the dictates of consumer demand;
(2) mandate technology transfer, treating technological development
as if it were a right in itself, not a favorable consequence of
economic incentives and property rights;
(3) charter a new global commercial entity entitled to do business
throughout the world, in favored competition with conventional
commerical entities, without being subject to any State taxation;
(4) establish a new international governmental Authority with tax
and regulatory reach far beyond the scope of activities and jurisdiction which require its creation;
(5) be governed by a "supreme" Assembly on the basis of one-Stateone-vote "majoritarianism," a system which bears no sensible
relationship to one-person-one-vote democracy, or to the real distribution of power, values, or interests; and
(6) be governed without checks and balances, without adequate procedural protection of minority interests, and without adequate
scope for judicial review.

In a press release following the Sixth Session, Ambassador Elliot
Richardson, the Special Representative of the President to UNCLOS,
termed the seabed provisions of the ICNT "fundamentally unacceptable" to the United States.8
WHO GETS

How

Controversy over substantive issues was not the only discouraging
aspect of Sixth Session negotiations on seabeds; disagreement also
surfaced over questions of Conference procedure.
In respect to the focus of the last session, more time, talent, and
attention was devoted to discussions on seabed mining than to any
other question; yet, this was the issue on which least progress was
eventually made. Even before the Sixth Session convened, a round of
multilateral consultations focused on seabed issues. These intersessional negotiations were held in Geneva from February to March,
1977, and produced an atmosphere of positive expectation on some of
the most troublesome Committee I issues.
Meanwhile, pursuant to a decision at the end of the Fifth Session,
the first three weeks of the Sixth Session were devoted almost exclusively to Committee I discussions on seabed mining issues. Minister
8. United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release USUN-57(77),
at 6, Jul. 20, 1977 (statement by Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson on file with the
San Diego Law Review).

Jens Evensen of Norway was appointed chairman of a "Working
Group of the Whole," and negotiations initiated in Geneva were
resumed.
These first three weeks were a period of hard bargaining, encouraging an active assertion of claims and counterclaims concerning the entire spectrum of seabed issues-production controls, financial arrangements, assembly and council divisions of power and composition, contract procedures, quota and anti-monopoly provisions,
and so forth. This plethora of activity indicated that the Conference
process was working, and indeed substantial advancement toward a
meaningful consensus was emerging. Minister Evensen succeeded in
producing a compromise text which, although not totally acceptable
to the United States 9 and other Conference participants, did
nonetheless reflect the hard-won progress which had been achieved
and was considered by most delegations as a basis for further negotiations.
The seabed provisions which finally emerged in the ICNT, however, deviated markedly from the Evensen formulations, and, as
noted, the manner of their production and substantive content are
unacceptable to the United States. In their present form, the provisions incorporate the views of a small contingent of developing
country representatives, none of which represents significant
consumer or producer interests in deep seabed mining. This small,
closed group unilaterally took it upon itself to upset the emerging
balance of interests which the Evensen-led negotiations had sought
to achieve.
Not only has this capricious procedural deviation set back negotiations on the design of a seabed mining regime, but it also is contrary
to the established precedent of placing before the general Conference membership for its consideration compromise proposals worked
out by interested parties in select groups or sub-Conference committees.'" Therefore, should the unorthodox ICNT provisions on the
9. See Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson, Statement on Minister Evensen's
Draft Text (June 10, 1977) (unpublished paper on file with the San Diego Law
Review).
10. The revised provisions on the legal status of the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), for example, were the product of negotiations among a sub-Conference
group of affected States-the so-called Castaneda Group-which formed to consider the status question informally outside the Committee framework. However, the Castaneda texts were subsequently placed before both the official
sub-Conference Committee on the EEZ and before the Conference Plenary for
their consideration and scrutiny. This *as done before the text was incorporated into the ICNT, in marked contrast to the procedure followed in
Committee I. For further discussion of the procedural evolution of the revised
EEZ text, see the United StatesDelegationReport (UNCLOS), Sixth Session of
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Jul. 29, 1977.
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seabeds regime be allowed to stand, they will surely provoke a crisis
of legitimacy for the negotiations which could further undermine the
Conference. Thus, the question of "who gets how" within UNCLOS,
a question of a fundamentally apolitical nature in sessions past, has
become one of the most salient and politicized issues within the
Conference.

WHO GETS WHEN

The question of "who gets when" was actually precipitated by the
United States during the Fifth Session of UNCLOS. In a gesture of
accommodation and compromise, then Secretary of State Kissinger
recommended to the Conference a package approach to seabed mining which included the idea of a review of the regime after its first
twenty-five years of operation. The purpose of the review was to
determine if the provisions of the treaty regarding the system of
seabed exploitation were working adequately. When put before the
Conference, this proposal elicited a positive reaction among delegations and was praised as a constructive contribution to a vital accommodation on seabed issues.
Discussions on the review proposal were resumed during the Sixth
Session, and the idea was incorporated into the ICNT. Article 153
provides that the Assembly convene a review conference twenty
years after the entry into force of the Convention. However, the
original intent and objective of the review system may be construed
as having been distorted. Instead of an event and process providing
an opportunity for an objective assessment and evaluation of the
system's operation, the review becomes a vehicle for transforming
the nature of the regime from an ostensibly parallel access system to
a unitary one, giving the Authority exclusive and uncontested jurisdiction over the terms, conditions, and opportunities for deep seabed
mining. Thus, Article 153, paragraph 6 of the ICNT asserts, in language uncharacteristically precise and unequivocal, that "[i]f the
, acConference fails to ... reach agreement within five years.
tivities in the Area shall be carried out by the Authority through the
Enterprise and through joint ventures. .. , provided however that
the Authority shall exercise effective control over such activities." As
one analyst of the seabed text of the ICNT has emphasized, this
provision could automatically ensure the conversion of the regime of
exploitation to a unitary system, provided that a determined group of

States is willing to "stall" the review for a period greater than five
years."
Therefore, even if those advocating total control by the Authority
over the seabed area are unable to achieve their objectives in the
short-term, Article 153, if retained, ensures and guarantees the success of their preferred alternative within the immediate future. Given
the several years of lead-time required before deep seabed mining
operations can actually be undertaken on a commercial scale, the
ICNT review provision alone, perforce, politicizes the issue of "who
gets when." Necessarily, it will be an issue of intense debate at the
upcoming Seventh Session of the Conference and is certainly one of
the major issues on which success or failure of the Conference
depends.
WHITHR LAW OF THE SEA?

This symposium in the San Diego Law Review, as the preceding
descriptive analysis. demonstrates, appears at a most critical period
in the history of the Law of the Sea Conference. In the context of
"who gets what, when and how," the Sixth Session has exemplified,
once again, the volatile political context of the negotiations.
In many respects, the Sixth Session also highlights several critical
dimensions in the gradual transformation of our international society: the saliency and highly politicized nature of economics in relations among nations; the growing capacity of developing countries to
identify and coalesce around mutually perceived core interests; and
the highly confrontational nature of the dialogue between developed
and developing States.
Furthermore, the results of the session challenge some of our more
traditional and fundamental premises about the nature and characteristics of the international system. Heretofore, issues pertaining to
national security and sovereignty have held premier place in the
hierarchy of State interests. Significantly, however, general accommodation was achieved on questions pertaining to the high seas
status of the economic zone, passage through straits, and the essential elements of a system of dispute settlement, all critical issues
which impinge most directly on the nature of national sovereignty.
The necessary ability and will to negotiate these issues, and a
marked absence of a similar capacity concerning seabed issues, must
be viewed in the overall context of attempts at systematic transformation of the international order.
11. See Darman, Problems with Part XI of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (unpublished paper on file with the San Diego Law Review).
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One can imagine that had this fundamental trade-off between
navigational and security interests and the design of a deep seabed
mining regime been the price of a comprehensive treaty in earlier
sessions of the Conference, a possible accommodation could have
been reached. However, there is a deepening and more sophisticated
perception among both developed and developing countries that the
issue of seabeds represents interests more fundamental than the
immediate economic benefits envisioned. Thus, as the negotiations
have progressed, the stakes in the process of "who gets what, when
and how" have been considerably enlarged and elevated. The issues
are no longer confined to pragmatic questions of State practice and
jurisdiction but encompass more issues of States' principles; the
mandate is no longer the technical design of a regime for deep seabed
mining but the architectronic construction of the contours of a future
international legal, economic, and political order; the struggle is no
longer for the codification of international law but a competition for
the control of future global institutions. In this context, national
interests are increasingly defined in terms of ideological categories:
centralization versus decentralization; private enterprise versus Authority control; resource policies versus free market principles; unitarianism versus pluralism; and equity versus efficiency. This trend
explains not only the increasing politicization of the negotiations but
also the critical nature of the current stalemate.
As our post-war international experiences have taught, the greater
the ideological aura surrounding political issues, the more national
postures toward these issues become dichotomized.
The United States, for its part, can neither afford nor does it desire
a "cold war" with developing countries, irrespective of the issues
involved. We continue to believe that a Law of the Sea Treaty is not
only desirable but essential to the management of interdependence in
ocean space. The conclusion of such a treaty could indeed usher in a
new era in ocean relations, one which could have a profoundly positive influence on the current state of international affairs, especially
between developed and developing countries. To this end, we are
actively participating in a series of intersessional meetings which
will be an important test of the readiness of the conferees to lay both
the procedural and substantive groundwork for the successful
conclusion of negotiations at the Seventh Session of UNCLOS
(scheduled to be held in Geneva from 28 March to 19 May 1978).

If others are 'prepared to do so, we will approach the Seventh
Session, as we have all others, with a sense of fairness and compromise, but also with a clear recognition that failure to reach a comprehensive LOS agreement could effectively doom the Conference. We
ask of our counterparts, and especially the developing countries, that
they too approach the upcoming session with a seriousness and resolve to reach a final agreement. For developing countries, the
Conference represents a first opportunity for universal participation
in the development of a new politico-economic and legal regime for a
significant aspect of contemporary and future international relations. It is a bold and challenging initiative; the opportunity must not
be missed.

